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DM.04Confidential compute

The fourth substrate, even the vendor can't read.

A fourth deployment substrate beyond DM.01 managed SaaS, DM.02 customer cloud and DM.03 sovereign datacenter. Workloads run inside hardware-enforced TEEs (Nitro Enclaves, Intel SGX, AMD SEV-SNP) — FlyttGo holds no tenant key material, ever, and cannot read memory even from privileged operator accounts.

CC.PRConfidential-compute pillars

Four anchors that move the trust boundary.

  • CC.PR.01

    TEE-isolated workloads

    Workloads run inside hardware-enforced trusted execution environments. AWS Nitro Enclaves on AWS, Intel SGX on customer-cloud, AMD SEV-SNP on sovereign datacenter. The vendor (FlyttGo) cannot read tenant memory, ever, even from a privileged operator account.

  • CC.PR.02

    Attestation on every spin-up

    Every TEE instance produces a hardware-signed attestation report on boot — measuring the kernel, the runtime, and the workload code. Tenants verify the attestation against a published manifest before releasing any tenant-managed key.

  • CC.PR.03

    Optional homomorphic analytics

    For programmes where even the trusted enclave cannot see plaintext (defence, intelligence), Civitas + EduPro analytics can run under partially-homomorphic encryption. Throughput is lower; cryptographic guarantees are absolute.

  • CC.PR.04

    BYOK · keys never leave

    Tenant-managed keys live in a tenant-controlled HSM and are released only to an attested enclave for a bounded session. FlyttGo never holds key material; rotation is initiated tenant-side.

CC.MDSupported TEE modes

Four hardware modes, one orchestration contract.

CodeHardwareCloud / substrateAttestationStatus
DM.04.NEAWS Nitro EnclavesAWS · regions per tenantNitro-signed attestation documentPreview
DM.04.SGIntel SGXCustomer-cloud · Azure / GCP confidential VMsIntel DCAP / Azure AttestationPreview
DM.04.SPAMD SEV-SNPCustomer-cloud + sovereign datacenterSEV-SNP guest attestation reportPreview
DM.04.NVNVIDIA Confidential Computing (H100)Customer-cloud · GPU-accelerated workloads

For AI inference under TEE — landing alongside the AI procurement assistant in Q3 2026.

NVIDIA local + remote attestationPlanned
CC.UCWhere confidential compute earns its complexity
  • CC.UC.01

    Defence + intelligence

    Workloads where even the cloud operator cannot see plaintext. Air-gapped sovereign deployments overlap with confidential compute for the strongest posture.

  • CC.UC.02

    Regulated finance

    PCI DSS Level 1 workloads with cardholder data, treasury operations, AML investigation flows. Memory-isolation removes the privileged-insider attack vector.

  • CC.UC.03

    Healthcare + research

    Multi-party computation across hospital networks where the data union must run without any party seeing the others. Civitas + EduPro analytics under confidential compute.

  • CC.UC.04

    Sovereign cross-border

    EU member-state programmes that share telemetry across borders without violating data-residency law. Each enclave is regulator-attested in-country.

Most programmes don't need DM.04. The 9-criterion deployment-substrate matrix in the research library (RS.08) shows when DM.02 customer cloud or DM.03 sovereign is the right call instead.

CC.NXWhere confidential compute plugs in

DM.04 sits inside the broader four-substrate framework.

Confidential compute is one shape among four. The four pathways below take a procurement team from this surface to a signed engagement.